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THE CORPORATE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE: A
DILEMMA FOR THE NONMEMBER DIRECTOR
JOHN

K. AURELL*

The corporations act in virtually every state and the District of
Columbia contains some provision to the effect that a corporation is
to be managed by its board of directors.1 Each such act further provides that the board of directors may designate an executive committee that may possess and exercise the powers of the board in the
2
management of the corporation.
Ordinarily, when the board does designate an executive committee,
that committee tends to take on a great deal of power and runs the
corporation for all intents and purposes.
Corporate boards today are comprised of varying numbers of
directors, sometimes running as high as fifty members. 3 The executive

committee is normally composed of a smaller group of directors
selected by the full board from among its membership. 4 Since it is
the executive committee which actually manages the day-to-day
affairs of the corporation, it follows that any affirmative mismanagement will probably have been perpetrated by the members of that
group. But, when a shareholder's derivative suit is brought on the
grounds of corporate mismanagement, all directors will probably be
joined as defendants - not just the members of the committee. If
the plaintiff prevails in such a situation, the non-executive committee
director faces the same joint and several liability as the executive
committee members. 5 The essence of the problem here is the fact
*B.A. 1956, Washington 8, Lee University; LL.B. 1964, Yale Law School; Member of the Dade County, Florida, Bar Association and the American Bar
Association.
1. E.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141 (a) (1953); FLA. STAT. §608.09(1) (1963);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW §701.
2. E.g., D.L. CODE ANN. tit. 8, §141 (c) (1953); FLA. STAT. §608.09 (2) (1963);
N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAiW §712 (a).
3. See People v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 124 App. Div. 714, 109 N.Y. Supp.
453 (1908).
4. As a general practice those directors who serve on the executive committee
are usually "inside" directors, or management directors. "Inside" directors are
those who also are officers of the corporation or serve the corporation in some
other capacity. For instance, it is normal for the president of the corporation also
to be a director. Thus he is an "inside" director. As opposed to the "inside"
director, the "outside" director has no function within the corporate structure
other than his duties as a director. He may be a prominent citizen in the community, a prominent businessman in some other industry, or even a lawyer. The
point to be made here is that an "outside" director can be anybody who is not an
officer or employee of the corporation.
5. Beard v. Achenbach Memorial Hosp. Ass'n, 170 F.2d 859 (10th Cir. 1948);
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that the defendants are individuals with limited resources, while the
recoveries in these cases are often gauged in the large dollar figures
more normally encountered only at the corporate level.
The specific question to be considered is this: Are directors who
are not members of the executive committee liable for the wrongful
acts of that committee? If the answer to this question is "no," then
a defendant-director who is not a committee member should be able
to successfully move to dismiss the suit as against him.
THE STATUTES

The various acts generally provide that the business of the corporation is to be managed by its board of directors, thus it follows that
the board, and each member thereof, is in some broad and general
way responsible for everything that goes on within the corporation.
The ultimate responsibility then lies with the members of the board
of directors unless there is something else in the statute providing
otherwise. Therefore, in order to escape responsibility for wrongful
acts committed by the executive committee, those directors not on
the committee must look to the other provisions of the statute and
to the cases construing and interpreting the statute.
As there are some fifty-one different corporation acts (fifty states
and the District of Columbia), it would be extremely tedious to deal
with each one individually. There are, however, three basic acts that
ought to be separately considered, since their influence has been
found to carry beyond state boundaries and throughout the country.
These are the Delaware General Corporation Law, 6 the Model Corporation Act,7 and the New York Business Corporation Law.s
The Delaware General Corporation Law, which is probably the
most widely imitated corporations act in the country, contains this
provision: 9
The board of directors may, by resolution passed by a majority of the whole board, designate one or more committees,
each committee to consist of two or more of the directors of
the corporation, which to the extent provided in the resolution
or in the by-laws of the corporation, shall have and may exercise the powers of the board of directors in the management of
the business and affairs of the corporation ....
Prichard v. Myers, 174 Md. 66, 187 At. 620 (1938); Cole v. Brandle, 127 N.J.
Eq. 31, 11 A.2d 255 (1940).
6. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (1953).

7. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus.
8.

N.Y. Bus. CoRP. LAW.

9.

DEL. CODE ANN.

CORP.

AcT (1953).

tit. 8, §141 (c) (1953).
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Sixteen jurisdictions- ° have adopted the executive committee provision of the Model Corporation Act."
If the articles of incorporation or the by-laws so provide,
the board of directors, by resolution adopted by a majority
of the full board of directors, may designate from among its
members an executive committee and one or more other committees each of which, to the extent provided in such resolution or in the articles of incorporation or the by-laws of the
corporation, shall have and may exercise all the authority
of the board of directors . . .. The designation of any such
committee and the delegation thereto of authority shall not
operate to relieve the board of directors or any member thereof
of any responsibility imposed by law.
The third major statutory treatment of the subject of executive
2
committees is found in the New York Business Corporation Law.'
(a) If the certificate of incorporation or the by-laws so
provide, the board, by resolution adopted by a majority of
the entire board, may designate from among its members an
executive committee and other committees, each consisting of
three or more directors, and each of which, to the extent provided in the resolution or in the certificate of incorporation or
by-laws, shall have all the authority of the board...
(c) Each such committee shall serve at the pleasure of the
board. The designation of any such committee and the delegation thereto of authority shall not alone relieve any director
of his duty to the corporation under section 717 (Duty of
directors and officers).
Section 712 (c) must be read in conjunction with section 717.13
10. Alabama, Alaska, Colorado, District of Columbia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa,
Maryland, Missouri, North Carolina, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, Texas,
Utah, and Wyoming.
11. ABA-ALI MODEL Bus. CoRP. ACr §38 (1953). (Emphasis added.)
12. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §712. (Emphasis added.) The legislative comment
to §712 states that this section was in part adapted from §38 of the Model Act, and
also that the extensive powers delegable to committees "make necessary a correlative increase in the responsibility of the full board for the acts of such committees." N.Y. Legislative Doc. (1961) No. 12, Original Supp., Revisers' Comment to
§7.12, enacted as §712, at 49.
13. N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAw §717. (Emphasis added.) In explaining the meaning of this provision, the legislative comment states: "This section is new. It is
said to represent the weight of judicial authority ....The prevailing rule in this
state with respect to the standard of care required of directors has been stated
judicially as the duty 'to exercise the same degree of care and prudence that men
prompted by self interest generally exercise in their own affairs' (see Kavanaugh
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Directors and officers shall discharge the duties of their
respective positions in good faith and with that degree of diligence, care and skill which ordinarily prudent men would
exercise under similar circumstances in like positions...
Today, due to the complexities of modern business, most major
publicly-held corporations have taken advantage of the preceding or
similar statutory provisions and have designated executive committees.
Within the limitations set out in the statute, cases, charter, bylaws, or
resolutions of the full board, the executive committee may pass
on all transactions involving the corporation. 14 Since the full board
is often composed of "outside" as well as "inside" directors, and probably convenes only a few times a year, it is expedient to use the
executive committee form so as to diminish the necessity of calling
a special meeting of the board when board action is required or be
forced to wait for the corporation to act until after the next regularly
scheduled board meeting.
THE ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON

Before discussing the cases that have dealt with whether or not
liability should be imposed upon non-executive committee directors,
it might be well to consider some of the arguments that have been or
can be used to attempt to persuade a court one way or the other on
the question.
To a large extent, the result reached depends on the view taken
of the relationship between the full board and its committees. If
the relationship is looked upon as that of principal-agent the board
should, technically, be responsible for any dereliction by its agent
(the executive committee) despite the most extreme care in selecting
v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918)).

However, it has

been recognized that the standard of care may vary according to the kind of
corporation involved and the particular circumstances in

which the director is

called upon to act (see Litwin v. Allen, 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (not otherwise reported))
... . The adoption of the standard prescribed by this section will allow the
court to envisage the director's duty of care as a relative concept, depending on
the kind of corporation involved, the particular circumstances and the corporate
role of the director."

Note that the legislative comment miscites the case name,

Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co. The correct citation is Kavanaugh v.
Gould.

14. On the general subject of what may and what may not be delegated to
an executive committee, see Hayes v. Canada, Atl. & Plant S.S. Co., 181 Fed. 289,
293 (1st Cir. 1910); 2 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §§549-52 (1954); LATrIN & JENNINGS,
373 (3d ed. 1959); 25 ALBANY L. REV. 93
BUFFALO L. REV. 469, 548 (1962); 35 Ky.
L.J. 156 (1947); 42 MICH. L. REv. 133 (1943); 47 VA. L. REv. 278 (1961).
CASES AND

MATERIALS

ON

CORPORATIONS

(1961); 6 ARK. L. REv. 486 (1952); 11
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it and in supervising its activities. If, on the other hand, the committee is viewed as an independent body endowed with the same
powers as the board of directors, it can be argued that the board
should be responsible only for failure in exercising proper care in
selecting the committee. This latter assumption carries the necessary
consequence that the members of the full board of directors might
escape responsibility for many important actions, affecting vital
corporate policy within the area of permissible delegation, by the
simple expedient of creating a two-or-three man executive committee.
What about the "outside" director vis-A-vis the "inside" director,
neither of whom is a member of the executive committee? It seems
that the "outside" director can make the point that he should not
be burdened with the duty to supervise the details of management
by which established corporate policy is administered, although the
extent of the duty of the "inside," or management, director in this
regard is not so clear. So, the "outsider" can try to set himself apart
from his "insider" colleague in his efforts to be excused from liability.
Nevertheless, there is a similar argument available to both "inside"
and "outside" directors who are not members of the executive committee. Should their responsibility attach to all wrongful actions of
the executive committee or only to some wrongful actions? Should
the members of the board of directors be responsible for everything
that goes on within the corporation during the interval between
regular board meetings, or only the more important transactions? A
very persuasive argument can be made by these directors that at the
very least, they should be held responsible for only those activities
of the executive committee of which an ordinary prudent man in
similar circumstances would have been aware. If one cannot be expected to know of something then he should not be held responsible
for it.
The proponents of imposing strict liability on all board members
state that the shareholders of the corporation elected the full board
of directors to run the business, not just the executive committee, and
if directors who are not members of the executive committee see
fit to rely on that committee, it is their own reliance and their own
risk. 15 But, there is another side to this argument. Although it is
true that the shareholders elected the full board, it is also true that
at the time of that election the shareholders had notice (actual or
constructive) of the statute authorizing the appointment of an executive committee, the corporate charter, and the bylaws of the corporation. Therefore, when the shareholders elected the board they were
aware that the major portion of the board powers would be turned
15. Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., 64 Misc. 303, 118 N.Y. Supp. 758
(Sup. Ct. 1909).
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over to the executive committee. Likewise, the executive committee
can only be composed of board members, and each member of the
board was elected by the shareholders.
Another argument strenuously urged by those who believe that
board members should have no responsibility, or only very limited
responsibility, for the acts of the executive committee is that if directors are required to exercise detailed supervision of the management
of each corporation of which they are directors, or if they are held
accountable for the neglect of the executive committee, it will be
difficult for them to accept positions on corporate boards because
of the time and risk involved. The thought is that the more business
acquaintances and business experience a man has, the more valuable
he will be to the corporation. If men meeting these criteria refuse to
accept positions on the board of corporations because of the risk
involved, it would be detrimental to the effectiveness of the entire
corporate system.16
Finally, it should be asked - Why should we ever treat the director who is not a committee member any differently? Why should
not all directors be held to the same strict standard? Are we not
really interested in protecting the public and the shareholders? This,
of course, is the ultimate policy question, and it is important that
this question be raised and given careful thought.
THE CASES

Briggs v. Spaulding17 decided by the United States Supreme Court
in 1891, is often cited for the proposition that directors generally
are not responsible for the acts or omissions of other corporate personnel (including other directors) unless they actually participated in
the wrongdoing. The case does not concern an executive committee,
however, it does discuss directors' liability for improper action taken
by a board-appointed agent of the corporation. It is worthy of note
that although dicta, the opinion briefly refers to the potential liability
of a director for the wrongful acts of other directors.'s
In Briggs the board neglected its supervisory duty and allowed
the president of a bank to have virtually unlimited control of the
management of the business. Regular board meetings were not held,
nor was an examining committee appointed as required by the bylaws. As a result of the inattention of the board, the president was
16. This is the argument that persuaded the New York Appellate Division in
Kavanaugh v. Gould, 147 App. Div. 281, 289, 131 N.Y. Supp. 1059, 1065 (1911) and
Fletcher in his treatise on corporations, 3 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS §1096 (1954).
17. 141 U.S. 132 (1891).
18. Id. at 147.
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presented with the opportunity to lend bank funds to himself and
his friends illegally. This resulted in a depletion of the corporate
assets and the bank soon became insolvent. It would appear that such
conduct should certainly result in liability, yet the Supreme Court
excused the various directors from responsibility for the misconduct of
the agent they had appointed, saying: 19
The degree of care required depends upon the subject to which
it is to be applied, and each case has to be determined in view
of all the circumstances. [The directors] are not insurers of
the fidelity of the agents whom they have appointed, who are
not their agents but the agents of the corporation; and they
cannot be held responsible for losses resulting from the wrongful acts or omissions of other directors or agents, unless the loss
is a consequence of their own neglect of duty, either for failure
to supervise the business with attention or in neglecting to
use proper care in the appointment of agents.
The majority of the justices in this 1891 decision felt that very
limited supervision was sufficient to relieve the directors of liability.
Although this case has not been expressly overruled, the present
tendency is to require directors to devote more attention to the
supervision of the activities of subordinates.20
The liability of a director not a member of the executive committee was dealt with in People v. Equitable Life Assurance Society.21
The case concerned a suit against all of the directors of Equitable to
require them to account for their official conduct in the management
and disposition of funds and property committed to their charge as
directors, and to require them to pay the company any money and
the value of any property that was lost or wasted through their
wrongful conduct. The full board was composed of fifty-two individual directors (both "insiders" and "outsiders"). The corporate
charter, however, stated that the corporate powers should be exercised by the board, "and by such officers and agents as they may
appoint, and from time to time empower." The bylaws provided
for an executive committee and a finance committee. The executive
committee was to act as an advisory committee to the president in all
affairs of the company, and had special charge of the investment of
the funds. During the intervals when the finance committee was not
in session, the executive committee was given all the powers of the
board of directors.
19. Ibid. (Emphasis added.)

20. Gamble v. Brown, 29 F.2d 366 (4th Cir.), cert. denied 279 U.S. 839 (1928);
Prudential Trust Co. v. McCarter, 271 Mass. 132, 171 N.E. 42 (1930).
21. 124 App. Div. 714, 109 N.Y. Supp. 453 (1908).

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

7

Florida Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1965], Art. 2
UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. XVII

The complaint charged a variety of wrongful acts on the part of
the defendant directors, ranging from the making of unlawful loans
and mortgages, to the voting of excessive salaries for themselves. It is
sufficient for our purposes that the complaint listed many wrongful
acts allegedly committed by members of either the executive committee or finance committee. Most of the defendant directors at one
time or another had been a member of one or both of those committees. One of the directors, however, had been neither a member
of any committee, nor was it alleged that he had any knowledge of
or reason to suspect any misconduct or violation of duty by any of
the committee members. The court held that the complaint should
be dismissed as against him, saying:22
The rule still is and must be, however, that each director is
only liable for his own acts or omissions, and that one is not
liable for the acts or omissions of another unless he participated therein to the injury of the corporation, or had some
knowledge by which in the exercise of reasonable care he
could have prevented the loss or connived at it, or failed to
perform his duty of exercising the authority he possessed to
prevent losses which should, in the exercise of reasonable
care and skill, have been foreseen and guarded against.
As authority for its statement of the law, the court cited Briggs v.
23
Spaulding and Cassidy v. Uhlmann.
This problem is considered in Fletcher's treatise on corporations.
Fletcher contends that the custom of appointing executive committees
in large corporations is a reasonable one and to be approved. He
concludes that, "in such a case the directors not on the executive
committee ordinarily are not liable for the negligence or the like of the
members of the executive committee. ' '24 Fletcher does, however,
recognize that noncommittee members are not relieved of all responsibility. He adopts as a statement of the law on this point a quotation from Kavanaugh v. Gould2s to the effect that, "[the directors]
are bound generally to use every effort that a prudent business man
would use in supervising his own affairs, with the right, however, ordinarily to rely upon the vigilance of the executive committee to
ascertain and report any irregularity or improvident acts in its management."2 6 As discussed below 27 the appellate division decision in
22.
23.
infra.
24.
25.
26.
27.

Id. at 731, 109 N.Y. Supp. at 467.
170 N.Y. 505, 63 N.E. 554 (1902).

See discussion of this case at note 31

3 FLETCHER, CORPORATIONS § 1096 (1954).
147 App. Div. 281, 131 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (1911).
Id. at 289, 131 N.Y. Supp. at 1064.
See discussion at note 39 inIra.
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Kavanaugh v. Gould was reversed by the New York Court of Appeals.
Therefore, the validity of Fletcher's statement of the law is questionable.
There are other cases that have more readily imposed liability
upon the membership of the full board for the wrongful acts of a
board-appointed committee.
Williams v. McKay28 involved a suit by the receiver of a savings
bank against all of the directors charging liability for losses due to
the negligence of the defendants in the management of the affairs
of the bank. The full board met only semi-annually, but the bylaws
provided for an executive committee composed of three directors with
the president and vice president of the bank as ex officio members.
The executive committee's duties were to take general charge of the
affairs of the bank, examine the account books, and report to the
semiannual meetings of the full board the amount of dividend to
be paid to the depositors.
The members of the executive committee were charged with gross
dereliction of their duties in that they allowed, through their negligence and mismanagement, the president and treasurer of the bank
to make imprudent, unauthorized, unlawful loans and investments.
The court specifically found that the members of the executive committee violated their duties as defined in the bylaws.
The directors who were not members of the committee strenuously
urged that they should not be held liable for the wrongdoings of
the committee members. They claimed that they were merely "outside" directors who met with the full board only twice a year. The
court met this argument by observing:29
These defendants held themselves out to the public as managers of this bank, and by so doing they severally engaged to
carry it on the same way that men of common prudence and
skill conduct a similar business for themselves.... But it does
not follow, because of the appointment of such officers and
committees, that the managers, who were not charged with
official duty, might relax vigilance, and rely entirely upon
officers and committees. A man of common prudence and skill
in managing a similar business for himself would not be
guilty of such unguarded confidence.
The following quotation from this case is often used as authority
for holding non-executive committee directors liable:3 0

28. 46 NJ. Eq. 25, 18 At. 824 (1889).
29. Id. at 36, 18 At. at 828.
30. Id. at 73, 18 At. at 842.
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The managers who were not upon committees were bound to
a reasonable supervision of the committees ...

that duty was so

plain that they are chargeable prima facie with knowledge of
all the important acts of the committees. If they were chargeable with knowledge of acts, by parity of reasoning they should
also be chargeable with knowledge of omissions, or non-performance of duty. It is true they deny knowledge of the
derelictions of their committee-men, but in face of proofs
that clearly show that the bank was notoriously operated by
Halliard and Hallanan in utter disregard of the committees,
this denial serves only to prove them to have been guilty of
gross negligence. Their professions of confidence in Halliard
will not protect them. The duty required of them was the
care that an ordinarily prudent business man exercises in a
similar business of his own; not a blind, unsuspicious confidence
in their president.
Cassidy v. Uhlmann31 presented the unique situation in which
a bank director who was not a member of a committee having the
management, direction, and actual control of said bank, found himself being held liable for committee-caused losses because of his
diligence above and beyond his duty. The opinion begins by observing that a board of directors may delegate some of its powers to
committees and individuals selected from the board. Then the rule is
stated that, "justice and public policy require that when one voluntarily takes the position of bank director he should exercise at least
the same degree of care that men of common prudence exercise in
32

their own affairs.."

Director Uhlmann, who was not a member of the committee, conducted his own personal investigation into the affairs of the bank
and in that manner discovered the wrongful acts of the committee.
On discovering the information, however, Uhlmann, for reasons not
made clear in the opinion, did nothing to bring it to the attention of
his colleagues. The court, in applying the man of common prudence
standard, found that Uhlmann should have at least attempted to call
a meeting of the entire board of directors. Therefore, Uhlmann
found himself in the unhappy position of being held liable for the
losses, although his less diligent brethren on the board who were
ignorant of the mismanagement evidently escaped that result.
Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co. 33 (and the various ap-

pellate decisions concerning it) is perhaps the leading case on this
31. 170 N.Y. 505, 63 N.E. 554 (1902).
32. Id. at 517, 63 N.E. 556.
33. 64 Misc. 303, 118 N.Y. Supp. 758 (1909).
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subject. Involved was a shareholder's derivative suit against all the
directors of the defendant trust company. Some of the defendants
were also members of the executive committee. Although there was
no statutory provision involved, the bylaws of the trust company provided that "the executive committee shall exercise all the powers of
the board of directors, when the board is not in session, except the
power to fill a vacancy in the board." 34 The complaint alleged that
the directors had wasted corporate assets through the negligent issuance of unsound loans. Although these loans were supposedly
authorized by the president of the corporation and the executive
committee, it is clear that the other members of the board of directors
had no knowledge that they had been made. The New York Supreme
Court held that the members of the full board were liable along
with the members of the executive committee on the ground that it
35
was the duty of all the directors to know of such affairs:
Directors, not members of the executive committee, are not excused from liability because they committed their duties to the
executive committee and relied upon them to examine the
loans and collateral. The stockholders elected the directors,
not the executive committee; and, if the directors saw fit to
rely on the executive committee, it was their own reliance and
their own risk. They may delegate the work, not their responsibility.
Kavanaugh v. Gould-6 reversed the New York Supreme Court's
decision in Kavanaugh v. Commonwealth Trust Co., and held that
the directors might divide their duties and responsibilities and that
directors not members of the executive committee were not chargeable
with knowledge of detail management reported only to the executive
committee, nor were they liable for the negligence of members of
that committee in the detail management of the corporation. The
court, however, did not relieve noncommittee directors of all re37
sponsibility, but rather called for a double standard:
The diligence required of them [members of the executive
committee] is, therefore, greater and the rule of their liability
more strict than that of a director not a member of that committee, for to them not only do the stockholders look for protection, but the directors themselves, and upon their fidelity
to their commission all parties must rely. . . .As applied to
the case at bar, as far as these directors are trustees for these
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id. at 310, 118 N.Y. Supp. at 763.
Id. at 316, 118 N.Y. Supp. at 767.
147 App. Div. 281, 131 N.Y. Supp. 1059 (1911).
Id. at 290-91, 131 N.Y. Supp. at 1065-66.
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stockholders, a division may be made both of duty and responsibility, and the directors generally are not liable for the negligence of members of the executive committee, as they would
in effect so be if they were chargeable with all the knowledge
which might be imputable to a member of the executive committee, by reason of his supervision of the detail management
of the corporation.
Basic to the Appellate Division's decision in this case is the reasoning
that men of broad and varied business experience ("outside" directors) are essential members of corporate boards for purposes of the
formation of broad corporate policy; yet at the same time, such men,
because of their varied interests, cannot afford to be made answerable
for the neglect of an executive committee that is given the duty of
supervision of the day-to-day affairs of the business. "Any construction of the law that would make it impossible for such men to accept
positions upon various boards of directors would seriously impair
both the effectiveness and stability of corporations; in fact be little
less than calamitous."38
This latter opinion was affirmed by memorandum decision,3 9 but
was subsequently reversed by the New York Court of Appeals. 40 The
court of appeals held that it is a question of fact whether under the
circumstances a director should have had knowledge of the unsound
transactions. "Care is a relative term."'41 The duty of directors is to
exercise "the same degree of care and prudence that men prompted by
self-interest generally exercise in their own affairs."42
It is certainly noteworthy that practically all of the cases cited
have to do with banks and bank directors. There is no reason given
in the decisions, however, to lead one to believe that the courts
were applying a special standard for bank directors. And as noted
above 43 the present New York act cites Kavanaugh v. Gould to exemplify the prevailing rule with respect to the standard of care required of all corporate directors.
From a close examination of the cases, it appears that there is a
thread that runs through them all, both those imposing and those
excusing liability. There are two considerations that appear throughout the decisions. For want of any better descriptive terminology
they will be called the "importance" consideration and the "knowledge" consideration.
38. Id. at 290, 131 N.Y. Supp. at 1065.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

153 N.Y. Supp. 1122 (App. Div. 1915).
Kavanaugh v. Gould, 223 N.Y. 103, 119 N.E. 237 (1918).
Id. at 113, 119 N.E. at 240.
Id. at 105, 119 N.E. at 238.
See note 13, supra.
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Williams v. McKay expressed the "importance" consideration as
well as any of these cases. Directors "are chargeable prima facie with
knowledge of all the important acts of the committees." 44 It is probably safe to say that the more substantial and important the transaction in question, the more likely that a court will fix liability on
the entire board. Nevertheless, if the impropriety involved only the
ordinary day-to-day conduct of the business by the executive committee, the chances are that a court would not hold the non-executive
committee members of the board liable.
The "knowledge" consideration is the other factor evident in the
cases, both those finding the entire board liable and those that do
not. Did the members of the board have knowledge of the transaction,
or should they have had such knowledge? Certainly the substantial
nature of the transaction must be considered in this context. The
more important the transaction the more likely that a court will find
that members of the board should have had knowledge of it, if in
fact they did not have such knowledge. Likewise, if a non-executive
committee director did not have knowledge of the transaction and
could not have reasonably been expected to know of it, the chances
are that a court will not impose liability. People v. Equitable Life
Assurance Society45 and Williams v. McKay4- state this concept quite
clearly.
This talk, however, about "importance" or "substantiality" on the
one hand and "knowledge," either actual or constructive, on the
other hand are actually only two aspects of the same principle. The
ultimate question on which most of the cases have turned in either
attaching or excusing liability is: What is the duty of a corporate
director toward his corporation? Should he be held responsible for
everything that goes on within his corporation, no matter how minor
and no matter whether or not he had, or should have had, knowledge
of it? If, when he is elected to the board of directors, a person assumes a certain duty, he cannot and should not be able to escape
that duty by the simple expedient of appointing a three-man committee. At the same time, the courts are faced with the injustice of
holding a person responsible for something about which he had no
knowledge and had no reasonable way to gain such knowledge.
Therefore, as indicated by the decisions, directors do not have a
duty to know of everything that goes on within the corporation. Their
duty is only to know those things that are "substantial" and "important." But, if a director for some reason does know of some act
or omission constituting mismanagement and could have acted to
44. 46 N.J. Eq. 25, 73, 18 At. 824, 842 (1889).
45. Supra note 21.
46.

Supra note 28.
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relieve the wrongful situation but did not so act, then a duty attaches
even though other directors without that knowledge (and who could
not have reasonably been expected to know of the situation) will
not be held responsible.47 The standard of care required of directors,
then, is the duty "to exercise the same degree of care and prudence
that men prompted by self-interest generally exercise in their own
affairs." 48 Or, stated another way, it is the duty to exercise "the care
that an ordinary prudent business man exercises in a similar business
of his own. ' ' 49 And, stated a third way, it is the duty to "exercise at
least the same degree of care that men of common prudence exercise
in their own affairs."50 There can be little doubt that each of the
three courts quoted above was expressing the same standard. For
purposes of this article, the standard will be referred to as the ordinary prudent man standard.
Thus, as the case law stands today, a director who is not a member
of the executive committee of his corporation will nevertheless be
held responsible for wrongful acts committed by the executive
committee (1) if he was in fact aware of the situation or transaction
and failed to act to correct it, or (2) if an ordinary prudent man in
the exercise of his own affairs would have been aware of the wrongful situation or transaction and would have acted to correct it. Such
a standard will allow the court to envisage the director's duty of care
as a relative concept, dependent upon the kind of corporation involved, the particular circumstances, and the corporate role of the
director.5 1
A director may not delegate his responsibilities to the executive
committee. He will be held to the same standard of duty he has always had as a director. Each director, however, does not necessarily
have the same responsibility to the corporation under this standard,
and thus when a lawsuit joins all directors as defendants, some may
be held liable and some may not.
THE STATUTES IN LIGHT OF THE CASE LAW

In view
present-day
corporation
norms, the
sistance.
47.

of the foregoing discussion, what can be expected of the
courts when faced with interpreting the various state
acts? A further consideration of the three major statutory
New York, Delaware, and Model Acts, should be of as-

This is what happened in

Cassidy v. Uhlmann,

170 N.Y. 505, 63 N.E.

554 (1902).
48. Kavanaugh v. Gould, 223 N.Y. 103, 105, 119 N.E. 237, 238 (1918).
49. Williams v. McKay, 46 N.J. Eq. 25, 73, 18 Atl. 824, 842 (1889).
50. Cassidy v. Uhlmann, 170 N.Y. 505, 517, 63 N.E. 554, 556 (1902).
51. See note 13, supra.

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol17/iss4/2

14

1965)

Aurell: The Corporate Executive Committee: A Dilemma for theNonmember Dir
LIABILITY OF CORPORATE DIRECTORS

Section 712 (c) is the key provision of the New York Business
Corporation Law. It provides that the designation of an executive
committee and the delegation thereto of authority shall not alone relieve a director of his duty to the corporation under section 717.
Section 717 states the duty of a director to be "that degree of diligence,
care and skill which ordinary prudent men would exercise under
similar circumstances in like positions." The New York Legislature
in its comment to section 717 states that this section is said to
represent the weight of judicial authority. Kavanaugh v. Gould is
cited therein to exemplify the prevailing rule in New York with
respect to the standard of care required of directors.5 2 Thus, it appears that the New York Act is a codification of the common law.
Section 141 (c) of the Delaware Act contains no apparent reference
to any residual responsibility in the board. We know, however, that
under section 141 (c) not all of the powers of the board of directors
may be delegated to the executive committee.53 Furthermore, the
Delaware Act is the very type of statute that has given rise to most
of the interpretive decisions by the courts on this subject. The
common law decisions apply precisely to the Delaware Act and those
acts similar to it. The New York Business Corporation Law provision
is new and the Model Act provision is relatively new, whereas the
Delaware-type provision has been in existence for some time. Therefore, any consideration of a Delaware-type statute must start with
consideration of the decisions discussed earlier in this article. It is
submitted that the ordinary prudent man standard is as applicable
under the Delaware-type acts as under the New York Act where it is
placed in print. The standard is the same in New York and Delaware.
Contrary to the Delaware Act, the Model Act deals specifically
with the subject. The final sentence of section 38 provides that "the
designation of any such committee and the delegation thereto of authority shall not operate to relieve the board of directors, or any
member thereof, of any responsibility imposed by law." What responsibility is imposed upon the directors by law? Is it not the same ordinary prudent man standard expressed in the cases? It must be. There
is no other standard given in the act, so that leaves us again with
the common law.
The result of this analysis brings us to the conclusion that throughout the country the standard is the same. The statutory language may
appear to be dissimilar at first glance, but when considered in more
depth the same standard emerges from each.
It is submitted that the ordinary prudent man standard is the
proper one. A man should be held responsible only for those things
52. See note 13, supra.
53. See note 14, supra.

Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 1965

15

Law Review,
Vol. 17, Iss. 4 [1965],
Art. 2
[Vol. XVII
UNIVERSITY Florida
OF FLORIDA
LAW REVIEW
about which he should reasonably be expected to know. It is unreasonable and unjust to require every corporate director to be aware of,
or at any rate responsible for, every minute thing that transpires
within his corporation. It is, however, equally unreasonable and unjust to excuse such a director of responsibility for transactions of such
magnitude and importance that an ordinary prudent man should have
been aware of them.
A director should not be allowed to delegate any of his responsibility. The crucial issue thus becomes: What is the responsibility
of a corporate director who is not a member of the executive committee? Since his duty or responsibility is to exercise that degree of
care and diligence expected of an ordinary prudent man in the exercise of his own affairs, one of the circumstances to be considered is
that a director not on the executive committee cannot reasonably be
expected to know of everything that occurs in the routine course of
the business of the corporation as governed by that committee during
the interval between board meetings. He should, however, be aware
of those matters of substantial importance to the corporation. "The
54
law has no place for dummy directors."
Some PartialSolutions for Board Members
In light of the present state of the law, what action might board
members take to protect themselves when they have granted full power
to their executive committee? We must keep in mind that although
board members will probably escape liability for relatively minor
acts of the committee, they will be held responsible for those wrongful transactions and situations that would have come to the attention
of an ordinary prudent man. These are the type of transactions that
more than likely involve the greatest amounts of money and thus are
of the greatest importance to the director seeking to protect himself
from liability.
(1) If a director who is not a member of the executive committee learns of some action on the part of the committee of which
he does not approve, he should register his dissent in some manner.
If the full board is passing on the activity of the executive committee, either by prior approval or by subsequent ratification, the
dissenting director should vote against the activity and have his
negative vote officially recorded in the minutes of the corporation,
as is provided in section 719 of the New York Business Corporation
Law. If he learns of the information other than at a board meeting, he should make efforts to have a special meeting of the board
54. Kavanaugh v. Gould, 147 App. Div. 281, 289, 131 N.Y. Supp. 1059, 1064
(1911).
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called if the situation dictates. At the very least he should register
his disapproval by letter to the members of the executive committee and to the secretary of the corporation, requesting that
his dissent be officially entered in the corporate records. Additionally, the situation might require that he take some action to
inform the shareholders of the wrongful activity.
(2) At the time the executive committee is designated, it
should be requested or required as a matter of corporate policy
that an agreement be signed wherein the members of the committee agree to indemnify the other board members for any
liability they might incur due to acts of negligence and/or mismanagement by the members of the executive committee.
(3) As a matter of tactics, so as to present a united front to
the opposition, an agreement should be drawn wherein the members of the executive committee agree to indemnify the board
members for any liability they might incur as the result of a
presently pending lawsuit. This will be a one-shot agreement
designed to be used only when a suit against all directors is
pending and the members of the executive committee are anxious
to maintain harmony among all defendants - to keep the defendants from fighting among themselves - and thus enable those
directors whose only hope is to defeat the suit on the merits to
put up a better defense.
CONCLUSION

In light of this analysis of the law, the corporate director who is
not a member of the executive committee is still faced with the
quandary of never being quite sure just where his duties and responsibilities begin and end. The ordinary prudent man standard
does help him to some extent, however, since under that standard the
court in each case is allowed to envisage the director's duty as a relative concept, depending on the kind of corporation involved, the particular circumstances, and the corporate role of the director.5 5 It
follows, therefore, that a director not on the executive committee
will probably be held to a lesser standard than one who is a member
of that committee. Likewise, an "outside" director who is not a member of the committee will probably not be held to quite as exacting a
standard as an "inside" director who is not on the committee. So the
director who is not a committee member is helped by the ordinary
prudent man standard to the extent that he knows his duty to the
corporation is probably not as strict as that of his fellow board member who is on the committee.
55.

Legislative Comment to §717, N.Y. Bus. CoRe. LAW. See note 13, supra.
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This is a reasonable result and one that should be encouraged.
In each case it will have to be determined whether in that situation
any one director who has played a particular role in the affairs
of the corporation has failed to live up to the standard.
It should be stressed that, for reasons of preserving the soundest
possible corporate management, in no case should any corporate
director be able to escape all responsibility for actions transpiring
within his corporation by the mere expedient of designating an
executive committee. The ordinary prudent man standard gives us
the most desirable result.
Directors who are not members of the executive committee will,
in all probability, be held responsible for wrongful acts committed
by the members of the committee involving major questions of corporate policy, and not responsible for acts concerning only the routine
day-to-day conduct of the business. It will be up to the courts in
each case to draw the line as to where a particular director's responsibility begins and ends.
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